INTRODUCTION
Economists often characterize optimal management of renewable resources in terms of a simple capital market equilibrium rule such as the rate of interest equals the rate of increase of population growth, a rule that leads to lower steady state resource stocks than the maximum sustainable yield prescribed by many biologists and environmentalists. Indeed, the biologists' rule which amounts to the economists' simple rule with a zero interest rate is fallacious, but the simple capital theory rules are little better because of costs, externalities, and increasing demand. Rules that treat cost properly are well known; in general, harvesting costs lead to increased steady state stocks. Externalities of the common pool or open access sort are known to lead to inefficiency, but the policy prescription is simply to restrict access so that the resource again follows a (cost adjusted) simple capital market rule. Besides the wellknown open access externality, many renewable resources such as range or forest provide a positive externality such as fishing in their streams, hiking across their expanses, and drinking water which runs off them. It is not customary for the landowner to be compensated for the water, hiking, or fishing his land provides, so these services are positive external economies. These positive external economies are often thought to be related to the stock of the underlying resource: the size or number of trees influences the quality of the hiking 2.
experience and the quantity of runoff. Optimal renewable resource policy should account for these externalities. Growing demand provides the last of the modifications to the simple capital theory rules presented here. When demand grows in a particular exponential fashion, "the steady state stock should be larger than it would otherwise be. To be precise, the entrepreneurs will act exactly as if they faced a stationary demand and a lower interest rate. In fact, if the numbers are fortuitously chosen, rational entrepreneurs (or a regulating agency) could end up acting as if the interest rate were zero, which is exactly the environmentalist-biologist maximum sustainable yield rule.
Although the growing demand model requires no government intervention to achieve an optimal path (assuming correct expectations), the case of positive.:-valued externalities does require intervention for optimality. Besides simply mandating the optimal harvest path, the government might try a number of tax or subsidy strategies. It turns out that harvest costs play an essential and surprising role in determining the efficacy of many of these policies. Section 2 .. 1 presents a partial equilibrium model of a renewable resource with harvest costs which draws heavily on Clark (2] and which has its roots in the work of Smith [16] , Scott [14] , and ultimately Lotka [9] .
In Theorem 1 the model is used to characterize a market equilibrium. In a market equilibrium that starts with a large resource stock, price starts low but rises faster than the rate of interest toward a steady state price. As the price goes up over time, the resource stock is diminished toward a steady state stock. Section 2 contains Theorem 2 which describes the market allocation over time if the demand curve shifts out at an exponential rate m. In this case of exponentially increasing demand, there is no steady state for price: in the long run it increases at rate m; however, stock does approach a steady state.
The simple capital theory rule relating rate of interest to rate of growth 3. increase and rate of price increase is modified by replacing the rate of interest with the rate of interest less m. To illustrate how exponentially increasing demand might come about, there is an example of a simple economy with a good manufactured from a renewable and nonrenewable resource. Section 3 is concerned with the optimal management of a resource when the resource stock per se has consumption value, an area first researched by Lusky [10J and
Vousden [18] for nonrenewable resources. Theorem 3 shows that the optimal resource policy with valued stock will have a higher steady state stock than the optimal policy without valuation of the stock; the theorem also presents the optimal pricing rule. Theorem 4 shows how to decentralize the solution of Theorem 3 using a stock subsidy. Theorems 5 and 6 are concerned with the results of actually observed resource policies that are designed to protect stocks. In Theorem 5 it is shown that taxing a product (lumber) would increase the steady s-tate stock of trees only if unit harvest costs were not constant.
Irrational conservation is examined in Theorem 6: the result is that legislated inefficiency does indeed raise steady state stock.
MODEL

Partial Equilibrium Mode l
Seven assumptions on the entrepeneurs and consumers define the partial equilibrium model.
Assumption I--The Growth Curve. In order to elucidate the price path of a renewable resource in a compe-titive environment, it is necessary to obscure the details of the population's age distribution. Accordingly, let x, a scalar, be the stock of the exploited population, and let its growth be described by the usual differential equation~= f(x) -h, where h is the harv€st or cut, 
where pet) is the expected and actual price at time t. The supply of resource is h(t) from each of the identical producers, and, for convenience, h(t) is taken as the industry supply; that is, the industry is treated as having only one price-taking firm.
The first step in solving this problem is to apply the maximum principle of Pontragin et ale [13] to the producer's problem. Let
be the Hamiltonian. Necessary conditions for an optimum are:
aH ax and substitute it into Eq. (4) to get
Eq. (6) shows part (a) of the theorem and provides one of two equations necessary to show part (b) of the theorem. In the case that unit costs are constant, Eq. (6)--when rearranged--states that the rate of net price~/ (p -c} increase is the rate of interest less the rate of growth increase (ff). Since f" < O--rate of growth increase decreases in stock--it is true that price increases fastest when the stock is large. In particular, when ff is negative, as is the case with a resource just beginning to be exploited, price increases faster than the rate of interest. The economic sense of the situation is that entrepreneurs 7.
holding large stocks lose interest--they could harvest the resource and put the money in a bank--and they lose growth. Growth happens at rate f, and £1 is the growth lost or gained from a small change in the stock. The rate of price increase--capital gains--must be enough to make up for both the lost interest and the lost growth. When costs are not constant, the matter is more difficult.
Price increases slower than (r -f') (p -c) by the amount c r f which comp-ensates for the extra costs incurred by reducing the stock.
Parts (b) and (c) of the theorem follow from examining the differential equation sys'tem described by Eq. (6) , the price equation; the simultaneous solution of the growth and demand equations,
and the transformed transversality conditions in terms of p,
.
Eq. (7) states that the change in stock equals growth less market demand. Since Eqs. (6) and (7) is not quite enough; it must also be possible to "get there" from somewhere else--solutions starting in other places must end at the stationary point. If the linearized differential equations system at the stationary point has at least one negative eigenvalue, it makes it possible to "get to" that stationary point. Saddle points have one negative and one positive eigenvalue. p -p* and~x = x -x*. To a first-order approximation, the problem of a renewable resource is:
f'(x*)~x (9) The characteristic polynomial is b 2 -bf' -Q' flt p*, and the characteristic roots are (10) 9.
which are real and of opposite sign, b 2 being negative, since the term 4Q'f"p* > o (Q' < 0 and fl' < 0). The opposition of the signs of the eigenvalue is sufficient to show that (x*, p*) is indeed a saddle point.
To aid in discussion, Figure 1 ,so (r -if) can only be zero somewhere on max that interval. As x~0 or K, p will approach an infinite price. The convergent arm (labeled z) exists because {p*, x*} is known to be a saddle point (8] .
The arrows, whose directions are easily verifiable, sh~w that the convergent arm must reside in regions II and IV. The horizontal line in the diagram at p = c is the break-even point. In the half plane below it, nothing would be harvested (h =0); but given the assumptions on demand" (no supply brings an infinite price), the convergent arm will always lie above the break-even line.
Any trajectory other than z must eventually end in quandrants I and III, both of which lead to violations of the transversality conditions.
Turning to the more general case of part (b) of the theorem: (ff -r) (12) shows that all the terms of the numerator save the last are positive while the denominator is negative. The last term in the numerator is positive for
,so the p = 0 curve slopes downward on x > x . Although it would max max be easy to draw cases 'of mult~ple -equilibria (Colin Clark [2] has done this),
assume the equilibrium is unique. Since the p = 0 curve starts above the x 0 curve, it must cross it (an odd number of times) from above. This crossing is a saddle point. The linearized system is
That p = 0 crases x ::::: 0 from above is equivalent to its having a greater slope than x = 0; in symbols,
where (B) is the upper right-hand corner term of 'the linearized system.
ing that r -£' and _Qf are positive and rearranging yields
Notic-
This shows that the determinant of the system is negative, the eigenvalues are real and of opposite sign, and the equilibrium is a saddle point.
12.
--. The existence of the harvest path is not quite enough to assure that the agents actually get on it. The individual entrepreneur must be constantly checking both the differential equation conditions (he must see that price is rising at the ri'ght rate) and the transversality conditions (he must see that the price-quantity ·path leads to a steady state and not some infinte price disaster from which he should profit). This problem was first studied by -Hahn [6] .
Stiglitz [17] finds these expectations--rational with respect to both day-to-day price change and the transversality conditions---to be a very strong assumption.
For instance, suppose a resource owner observes a price lower than he expects.
If he believes his calculations and his estimate of the total resource stock, he withholds his supply from the market and attempts to establish a ttlong" position in the commodity; these actions tend to push price up and lead to stability.
To the contrarYt assume the producer is unsure of the total resource stock.
When price is lower than expected~"the producer concludes that the true industry stock was greater than he thought. He adjusts his plan by selling more and depressing price further: clearly an unstable situation. Which of these scenarios is more realistic, is open to question. For want of a better assumption, it is assumed that the expected prices are realized and are on the convergent arm. This was Assumption 3.
Nonautonomous Demand
Stationary demand curves of the sort used in Theorem I do not account for increased demand incident on such things as growing population, increasing wealth, or changing relative prices. When these time-varying factors affect demand by moving the demand curve outward at an exponential rate, the partial 14.
equilibrium model can still be sOlved. Clark and Munroe [3] treat the related case of exogenously increasing price. Theorem 2 characterizes the solution.
Following the proof of the theorem is an example of how changing relative prices in a competitive world led to exponentially shifting resource demand. Proof. The same steps--maximizing firm profits and substituting in the demand curve--that lead to Eqs. (6) , (7), and (8) give
lim pet) ert x(t) t-)<X) o (transversality) (18) A solution involves exponentially increasing prices at rate m. Choose a new -mt variable q(t) = e pet) and rewrite the system in terms of this new variable: (20) lim q e(~r)t x(t) t~o .
(21)
15.
When the time preference (or interest) rate is greater than the rate of demand increase (r >~)t there is a steady state in the q -x space which corresponds to a solution where pJp = m. The steady state occurs at a resource stock x*(m) that is higher-than the zero increase in demand steady state stock x*(O). Because of the concavity of f, x*(·) is monotonically increasing in m.
One troublesom~-detail remains: if m > r, then the proposed solution no longer meets the transversality condition--the economic problem underlying the transversality condition is the finiteness of the present value-of a unit of the resource sold in the future. YJ'hen prices go up faster than the rate of interest forever, the present value of eVen a carelessly made plan would be infinite.
Criteria concerning vector dominance or overtaking--not present value--are appropriate for judging plans in these unhappy circumstances; below, the discussion is limited to m < r.
Since the equations for the nonautonomous demand case are the same as those that lead to Theorem 1, save the replacement of p by q and r by r -m, the analogous theorem. in the new phase space is also true.
An Example
One situation in which demand is not autonomous is a world dependent upon only a renewable and an exhaustible resource. From the outset, it will be clear that it is a grim world: neither manufactured capital nor technical progress nor high elasticities of substitution are allowed to preclude the Malthusian doom (Dasgupta and Heal [5] and Stiglitz [17] investigate these reasons for continued growth with exhaustible resources).
A single consumption good (g) is produced by a Cobb-Douglas production function with parameters a and B from the renewable resource (stock x, flow h) and the exhaustible resource (stock yy flow k). Social welfare--or the utility of a representative agent--is given by a function u = gY. This small economy can be viewed either as a competitive equilibrium problem, a planning problem, or a market equilibrium problem in which agents act to maximize present value of profits or utility subject to a present value budget constraint. Since there is only one consumer and no externalities, the solutions will be identical.
To find the market equilibrium, start with the consumer's problem. The consumer's problem in such a world would be to -ay (27) and, in the Cobb-Douglas case, these are is substituted into the equation. Thus, the world with only a renewable and nonrenewable resource can be modeled in an explicit demand and supply framework, and that framework leads to a renewable resource industry facing a nonautonomous demand.. Because the computation of consumer wealth (rents in the resourceholding industries plus the profits of the consumer good-producing firms) is difficult, it is easier to find the solution to this economy in terms of the equivalent planning problem.
Under these conditions, the planning problem is subject to
The Hamiltonian is 19.
(30)
Making the change to current t~me-price variables p the necessary conditions are
The maximum principle yields 
Solving the two marginal utility conditions and substituting So e rt for set) yields
which is an exponentially decreasing, nonautonomous demand curve of exactly the form discussed in the previous section. In this example, that section's parameter m is rB/(S -1) and, since it is negative, r > m whatever the (permissible)
values of a and B. Using the results of the section on nonautonomous demand curves, the renewable resource sector acts just as if its time preference rate were r -m, except that renewable resource prices constantly fall at rate m instead of being stationary. The exhaustible resource is not depleted in finite time. Asymptotically, its rate of extraction is given by
where h* is the steady state renewable resource flow and So is determined from the initial conditions and transversality. Clearly, k decreases at an exponential rate, as does u (h, k), revealing the increasing degree of misery promised in th is model. 21.
EXTERNALITIES
1. Introduction
Externalities are the more usual reasons cited for aiming for a steady state resource stock greater than that given by f'{x*) = r. Vousden [18] and Lusky [10) have made analogous arguments for the pure theory of exhaustible resources, and Calish, Fight, and Teeguarden [1] use estimates of stock-provided externalities to determine the optimal stock in a Faustman-type forestry problem. The essence of the problem is that the stock of a resource provides benefits a(x) to society but that these benefits are not captured by the resource owner. Examples in forestry include water, hiking, wildlife, and pretty views. To account for these externalities, a regulatory agency would try to induce the resource owner to hold a higher stock than he would under competition.
The usual sorts of policy instruments are available. Standards are frequently enforced for reforestation but, except on public lands, are not used to determine the resource stock itself. Taxes are not currently employed to encourage an increase in forest stocks; to the contrary, the current taxes discourage the holding of even as much as the free market competitive resource stock [11] . The maximum principle on the assumption lim U(b) h+O u' (h) = p. 00 yields (45) The usual manipulation of the utility function gives the demand curve hD(p) = U,-l(p) which is then used to reduce the equations to a two-equation system: 
48)
The x = 0 locus is identical to that of Eq. (7) while the p = 0 locus is simply displaced upwards from that of Eq. (6) 
2 • Product Taxes
Discouraging use of a commodity by taxing it is the economist's "Pigouvian" prescription. A tax on the flow of the resource would be relatively easy to collect; but, as Plott [12] recognized, taxing a commodity to influence the consumption of its factors of production may be less than successful. In the case of a product-taxes effect on the stock of a natural resource, the situation is not as bad as that of an ordinary factor market; at worst) the tax has no effect on the resource stock. 3 the tax has no effect on product j1ow.
26.
The usual manipulation of the Hamiltonians yields:
The phase diagram) Figure 4 , shows the dowrnvard shift of the x = 0 curve and makes parts (a) and (c) of the theorem plain. To show part (b): at any point t dp/dT ; 0 while a~/dT > 0; thus, the (p,~) vector field is warped upward--that is, trajectories point higher through given points in quadrant IV.
Irrational Conserrvation
Irrational conservation refers to the practice of increasing extraction costs to reduce the flow of a resource product. Crutchfield and Pontecorvo [4] examine salmon, an open-access resource, and conclude that restrictions of the type of gear cause large losses over a system of regulating catch directly.
Indeed, there is no question that legislated inefficiency will not be an optimum policy for a solely owned resource; but since it is easy to legislate standards, it is still of interest to see what could be accomplished with such a policy.
Let Ac(x) be nonzero unit costs where A is a technical change parameter. A policy of irrational conservation is one that increases A. ;If ---z·., 
• Since dp/aA < 0, the p = 0 curve will be shifted upward wherever it slopes down.
When unit cost is constant, the cost increase has no effect on stock and product flow, or it results in a shutdown of the industry. Figure 5 gives the phase diagrams in this case. By an argument like that for the case of taxes, it can be shown that the new convergent arm lies everywhere above the old one.
CONCLUSION
Neither choosing the optimal long-run renewable resource stock nor attaining the planned goal is easy. Simply equating a rate of growth to a rate of time preference--as if determining the rate of time preference were simple--will not work if there is anticipated growth in demand or a significant externality attached to the resource stock. Failure to account for demand growth or an externality both result in too Iowa plan for the resource stock. In the case of an externality, a regulatory agency might find the traditional tax tool for correction of an externality to be very difficult to handle. Taxing the product--the easiest tax to levy--has an effect on stock that is critically mediated by the slope of the unit cost curve. If the curve is flat, the tax has little effect on ultimate stock. Regulation of production techniques will be inefficient, while stock subsidies are hard to administer because of the difficulty in measuring stock and the requirement for a dispersion of public monies. In short~the optimal regulation of or management of renewable resources cannot be meaningfully reduced to an r = f' (x) or other such simple rule.
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